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of state constitutions limit the amount of debt a state may incur/ state
legislatures frequently have attempted to circumvent such limitations.
Recent decades have seen increased use of the "authority," set up by
the legislature to accomplish a particular objective and given power
to issue evidences of indebtedness to :finance the objective, repayment
to come from the revenues of the authority, with the declaration that
the obligations of the authority are not those of the state. The enabling
legislation has been challenged as unconstitutional, often on the ground
that the obligations of the authority are in fact those of the state, thus
creating a debt of the state. The courts have been obliged to determine
the precise status of the authority's long-term debts in order to ascertain
whether the constitutional debt limitation has been violated.
Lack of extensive judicial precedent has led the courts to consider
analogies drawn from the law of municipal corporations, especially in
regard to the "special fund" doctrine. There has been a tendency to
hold that where the state sets up an authority to construct a particular
facility and the authority's sole source of revenue is payments made
by users of the facility, such an authority is self-liquidating. As the
authority's revenues are distinct from general state revenues, its obligations are not considered to be the debt of the state: thus there is no
violation of the constitutional debt limitation.2 Some courts, however,
have been reluctant to adopt this viewpoint,3 while others have extended the scope of the "special fund" doctrine, holding that where
the authority has sole claim to special taxes, to be used to pay principal
and interest charges, the debt is not the debt of the state, although the
state acts as intermediary in collecting the taxes. In such cases, however,
I See, for example, MICH. CoNST. (1908) art. X, §10: "The State may contract debts
to meet deficits in revenue, but such debts shall not in the aggregate at any time, exceed
two hundred filty thousand dollars. The State may also contract debts to repel invasion,
suppress insurrection, defend the State or aid the United States in time of war. • . •"
W1s. CoNsT. (1848) art. VIII, §4: "The State shall never contract any public debt except
in the cases and manner herein provided." Sec. 6. "For the purpose of defraying extraordinacy expenditures the State may contract public debts (but such debts shall never in the
aggregate exceed one hundred thousand dollars) .•.."
2 See California Toll Bridge Authority v. Wentworth, 212 Cal. 298, 298 P. 485
(1931); Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 203 Okla. 335, 221 P. (2d) 795
(1950); New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N.J. 235, 69 A. (2d) 875 (1949);
People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 ill. 77, 64 N.E. (2d) 4 (1945). See also McClain v. Regents of the University, 124 Ore. 629, 265 P. 412 (1928); Loomis v. Callahan,
196 Wis. 518, 220 N.W. 816 (1928). Also see 72 A.L.R. 687 at 688 (1931), and 146
A.L.R. 328 (1943) and cases cited therein.
s Idaho courts have held that the special fund doctrine is not the law of the state.
State Water Conservation Board v. Enking, 56 Idaho 722, 58 P. (2d) 779 (1936). North
Dakota appears to consider that state ownership of the land on which the facility is to be
erected is the determining factor. See Wilder v. Murphy, 56 N.D. 436, 218 N.W. 156
(1928) and Lang v. Cavalier, 59 N.D. 75, 228 N.W. 819 (1930).
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it is customary to require that the state shall have segregated the
proceeds of such tax or taxes from the general tax funds. 4
The courts have shown some inclination to apply to the statecreated authority5 the view, widely held, that a municipality incurs
an obligation where it mortgages an existing facility to finance an addition to it or to erect other facilities. 6
More recently, state legislatures have set up authorities to finance,
construct, and maintain a facility for the use of the state itself. Sale
of the authority's obligations is to provide the funds, with repayment
to come from revenues of the facility. The authority is authorized to
make agreements with the state or the agencies of the state, under
which is assumed the obligation to make a series of payments to the
authority, usually termed rentals, set at an amount to cover principal
and interest charges on the debt. The state, in this way, becomes the
sole supplier of revenue to the authority.
Some courts have held this arrangement an instalment-purchase
and hence unconstitutional, because in reality the state has contracted
to make payments on principal and interest, thus incurring a debt. 7
This view is more acceptable where, as often occurs, upon repayment
of the authority's obligations, the property of the authority becomes
the property of the state. Other courts have considered this arrangement to be a lease: as the authority is created as a separate legal entity,
the source of its income is immaterial; since the operations of the
authority are self-liquidating, its debts are not state debts, and the
constitutional limitation is inapplicable. 8 In other words, some courts
4 See, for example, State Highway Commissioner v. Detroit Controller, 331 Mich. 337,
49 N.W. (2d) 318 (1951); Johnson v. McDonald, 97 Colo. 324, 49 P. (2d) 1017 (1935);
In re Senate Resolution No. 2, 94 Colo. 101, 31 P. (2d) 325 (1933).
11 Wilder v. Murphy, 56 N.D. 436, -218 N.W. 156 (1928); Public Institutional
Building Authority v. Griffith, 135 Ohio St. 604, 22 N.E. (2d) 200 (1939); State ex rel.
Vernon W. Thomson, Attorney General v. E. C. Giessel, Director of Budgets and Accounts, (Wis. 1954) 65 N.W. (2d) 529 (1954). However, such principle was not
applied in Loomis v. Callahan, 196 Wis. 518, 220 N.W. 816 (1928).
6 See 72 A.L.R. 687 at 698 (1931) and cases cited therein. A discussion of the
principles involved in such decisions may be found in State ex rel. Morgan v. Portage, 174
Wis. 588, 184 N.W. 376 (1921). Some, though not all, courts have held that a municipality may not pledge revenues from an existing property as security for a debt to build
an addition to such property. This principle was extended to a state-created authority in
Public Institutional Building Authority v. Griffith, 135 Ohio St. 604, 22 N.E. (2d) 200
(1939). Note cases cited therein.
7 McCutcheon v. State Building Authority, 13 N.J. 46, 97 A. (2d) 663 (1953);
Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. 183, 79 A. (2d) 753 (1951); Public Institutional Building Authority v. Griffith, 135 Ohio St. 604, 22 N.E. (2d) 200 (1939); People ex rel.
Greening v. Green, 382 III. 577, 47 N.E. (2d) 465 (1943).
8 Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937); Preston v. Clements, 313 Ky. 479,
232 S.W. (2d) 85 (1950); Loomis v. Keehn, 400 Ill. 337, 80 N.E. (2d) 368 (1948).
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consider the source of the authority's income as determining whether
its debt is in reality the state's debt, while other courts are more impressed by the end to be achieved and whether there has been technical
compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements and limitations.
Three cases decided in 1928 indicate some of the factors considered
by courts in determining the status of debts incurred by a state-created
authority. In Wilder v. Murphy° the North Dakota court held unconstitutional statutes which permitted a pledge of state-owned land on
which the authority was to erect a dormitory. This was in spite of
the fact that the authority's obligations were to be retired solely from
revenue paid by the users of the dormitory. The opinion stated that
"the property of the state is mortgaged and pledged and to that extent
there is an obligation to pay on the part of the state. Thus it seems
to us there is created a debt within the meaning of that term as used
in the constitutional prohibition."10
The Oregon court in McClain v. Regents of the University, 11
however, held that the regents were free to lease portions of the campus
to a person or corporation which would construct dormitory facilities
thereon, to contract to pay as rental sums adequate to cover principal
and interest payments, and to pledge income from the operation of the
dormitories to secure such rentals. The court noted that the only liability lay against a "special fund which is to be made up exclusively of
net rentals." The decision stated that the court was d~ciding only the
precise question before it and did not undertake to say to what extent
the "special fund doctrine" should be applied.12
In Loomis v. Callahan13 the Wisconsin court held that no debt of
the state was incurred by an arrangement which permitted the University regents to lease the partially completed Memorial Union Building and the land on which it stood, located on the University campus,
to the state-created Wisconsin Building Corporation. The corporation
was to pledge its leasehold to the annuity board of the State Retirement
System as security for funds advanced by the board to complete and
furnish the Union. Upon completion and furnishing of the building,
the corporation would re-lease it to the regents. Revenues from its
operation would be used to pay rentals due the corporation. The
9

Wilder v. MUiphy, 56 N.D. 436, 218 N.W. 156 (1938).
at 445.
llMcClain v. Regents of the University, 124 Ore. 629, 265 P. 412 (1928).
12 Id. at 636.
1s Loomis v. Callahan, 196 Wis. 518, 220 N.W. 816 (1928).
10 Id.
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corporation would use such rentals to retire its obligations. Prior to the
actual leasing of the University property to the corporation, the regents
enacted the requirement that each University student was to pay a fee,
thus creating revenue to supply the rentals due the corporation. Loomis,
a taxpayer, brought the action, alleging among other objections, that
the transaction gave rise to a state debt within the meaning of the constitutional limitation. However, the plaintiff's brief did not point out
that an existing facility was to be pledged as security for funds to complete that facility nor that state-owned lands were to be pledged as
security for repayment of the loan by the annuity board.
In the majority opinion, the court stated:
"It is of no legal consequence to say that the plan is a subterfuge and devised for the mere purpose of circumvening the constitution. That may be admitted without answering the question
thus presented one way or the other. In order to condemn the
transaction it must be found that it creates a state debt within the
meaning of the constitution. Even though any plan which places
needed buildings at the disposal of the state may be said to circumvene the constitution, it does not offend the constitution unless the
plan does give rise to a state debt within the meaning of the constitution."14
The lease and re-lease device reappeared in Kelley v. Earle,1 5
often considered the leading case on the status of debts contracted by
a state-created authority. Here, the authority was to provide permanent public works and improvements. The Federal Emergency Relief
Administration would pay nearly half the cost of the projects and
finance the balance through purchase of the authority's revenue bonds.
State-owned land was to be leased to the authority which would construct projects thereon and lease them to the state or the agencies or
departments of the state. Principal and interest on the authority's
obligations were to be met from rentals paid to the authority by the
lessees. The first group of leases provided that the land and improvements thereon would ultimately become the property of the state. The
court held that the state had assumed a continuing obligation which
constituted a debt in violation of the constitutional debt limitation.1 a.
As a result, new leases were drawn, providing that upon termination of
the lease, title and ownership of the project and the land would vest
in the authority. With this alteration, the courts held the arrangement
14 Id.

at 524.

tis Kelley

16 Kelley

v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937).
v. Earle, 320 Pa. 449, 182 A. 501 (1936).
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to be a long-term lease, which was permissible for the state to make.
The unanimous opinion stated:
"The State pays as it goes and receives consideration for each
payment as it falls due. There is no purchasing here on the credit
of the future; for each payment made there is a present benefit to
the State. No title under the leases or agreements passes to the
Commonwealth; it remains with the Authority.
"It is urged that the transaction is in effect a purchase of capital
assets by installments. To sustain this conclusion, of necessity we
must hold the agreement a sale; we have held the agreement is a
lease and nothing more."17

In People ex rel. Greening v. Green18 the Illinois court held that
the obligations of an authority, created to construct office buildings
for state offices, ultimate ownership of such buildings to vest in the
authority, were a debt of the state. The court observed that the rent
to be paid by the occupying state offices was the only contemplated
source of revenue for the_ authority, that amounts due under the leases
were designed to meet principal and interest payments due on the obligations, and thus state appropriations would have to be sufficient to
cover such amounts. The court stated:
"The intent and purpose of the constitutional restrictioJ?. is to
impose a limitation on the power to appropriate, by limiting the
amount of indebtedness which may be incurred without a vote [of
the electorate]. ... The general scheme and plan of this act, upon
which no limit is set, affords an opportunity of paying off the
bonded indebtedness by appropriations and taxes which might well
be construed as doing indirectly what the State cannot, because of
the constitutional limitation, do diiectly." 19
Five years later, however, the same court in Loomis v. Keehn,2°
held constitutional and as not creating a debt of the state, an act which
set up the Illinois State Armory Board and permitted it to issue obligations to erect buildings for lease to the state. Upon repayment of the
bonded indebtedness, the board was to donate the property to the state.
Rentals from annual state appropriations were to be paid to the board.
People ex rel. Greening v. Green21 was distinguished on the ground
that the board of directors of the earlier authority was composed "sub17Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337 at 349 et seq., 190 A. 140 (1937).
1s People ex rel. Greening v. Green, 382 ill. 577, 47 N.E. (2d) 465 (1943).
19 Id. at 586 et seq.
20 Loomis v. Keehn, 400 ill. 337, 47 N.E. (2d) 368 (1948).
21 People ex rel. Greening v. Green, 382 ill. 577, 47 N.E. (2d) 465 (1943).
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stantially of all of the State Officers. . . . The identity of the State,
through its officers, and its public Authority through the same officers,
was so perfect as to make the one but the shadow of the other, and
hence the obligation of the Authority was recognized as the obligation
of the State. . . ."22 The court further observed that the fact the state
made annual appropriations to pay rents due did not create a debt. 23
Courts of other states, faced with similar fact situations, have dealt
in a variety of ways with the problems posed by the constitutional debt
limitation. Some have been primarily concerned with the form of the
proposed agreement between the authority and the state and have not
been disposed to look behind the fac;ade of legality. For example, the
California court in Dean v. Kuchel24 approved a lease between the
state and a private partnership where the partnership was to erect an
office building on state-owned land leased by the partnership, and release the land and building to the state which had contracted to pay
monthly rentals for a term of years, at the end of which time the state
would acquire title to the property. This was held to be a simple lease:
the legislature was not bound to make appropriations and as the state
was not bound for the future, no debt was incurred and there was no
violation of the constitutional debt limitation. A vigorous dissent, however, characterized the transaction as a contract of instalment purchase,
disguised as a lease. The Kentucky court was in substantial agreement
with the California court in Speer v. Kentucky Children's Home25 and
Preston v. Clements, 26 as was the Indiana court in two cases involving
the debt limitations of municipal corporations, Jefferson School Township v. Jefferson Township School Building Co. 27 and Protsman v.
Jefferson-Craig Consolidated School Corporation of Switzerland
County. 28
The Michigan court in Walinske v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Building
Authority2° held that bonds proposed to be issued by the authority to
construct a joint city-county building, to be retired through rents paid
to the authority under leases to be executed with the city and the
22 Loomis
23

v. Keehn, 400 Ill. 337 at 343, 47 N.E. (2d) 368 (1948).

Id. at 341.

2 4 Dean v. Kuchel, 35 Cal. (2d) 444, 218 P. (2d) 521 (1950).
25 Speer v. Kentucky Children's Home, 278 Ky. 225, 128 S.W. (2d) 558 (1939).
2 6 Preston v. Clements, 313 Ky. 479, 232 S.W. (2d) 85 (1950).
2 7 Jefferson School Township v. Jefferson Township School Building Co., 212 Ind.

542, 10 N.E. (2d) 608 (1937).
2 8 Protsman v. Jefferson.Craig Consolidated School Corp. of Switzerland County, 231
Ind. 527, 109 N.E. (2d) 889 (1953).
29 Walinske v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Building Authority, 325 Mich. 562, 39 N.W.
(2d) 73 (1949).
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county, were not subject to the debt limitation imposed on municipal
corporations. In its opinion the court avoided passing on whether the
proposed contracts were actually leases or contracts of purchase, stating
that, 'We cannot pass on the lease in the instant case as it has not been
executed and is not before us...."30
On the other hand, the Ohio court in State ex rel. Public Institutional Building Authority v. Neffner, Secretary of State, 31 the New
Mexico court in State Office Building Commission v. Trujillo, 32 the
Maine court in Opinion of the Justices, 33 and the New Jersey court in
McCutcheon v. State Building Authority34 tended to emphasize the
essential nature of the proposed transaction. These courts held the
debts of the several authorities to be those of the several states and in
violation of the constitutional debt limitation.
In State v. Neffner3 5 an authority was set up. to construct buildings
on state-owned lands to house the inmates of a certain institution. The
buildings were to be leased to the department of welfare which was to
pay to the authority, up to the amount of the specified rentals, all fees
received for the support of these inmates. The rentals would supply
funds to retire the authority's bonds. The court refused to extend the
"special fund" doctrine on the ground that the payments had been
earmarked for the support and care of the inmates and if diverted to
repayment of the authority's obligations the state would be obliged to
draw on the general tax funds to care for its wards. The opinion pointed
out that the agreement to pay the rentals created an agreement to pay
a 6.xed surri just "as if the state had agreed to pay the interest and the
accruing principal installments by warrant drawn upon the [state]
treasurer." Thus the obligations of the authority would be "the ultimate
obligation of the state. To hold otherwise would result in an evasion
of the constitutional limitations."36
The constitutionality of state legislation creating an authority to
construct an office building for state offices and agencies was challenged
in the New Mexico, Maine, and New Jersey courts. Each of the
authorities had been given power to issue evidences of indebtedness,
30 Id.

at 578 et seq.
ex rel. Public Institutional Building Authority v. Neffner, Secretary 0£ State,
137 Ohio St. 390, 30 N.E. (2d) 705 (1940).
· 32 State Office Building Commission v. Trujillo, 46 N.M. 29, 120 P. (2d) 434 (1941).
33 Opinion 0£ the Justices, 146 Me. 183, 79 A. (2d) 753 (1951).
34 McCutcheon v. State Building Authority, 13 N.J. 46, 97 A. (2d) 753 (1953).
35 State ex rel. Public Institutional Building Authority v. Neffner, Secretary 0£ State,
137 Ohio St. 390, 30 N.E. (2d) 705 (1940).
36 Id. at 398-399.
31 State
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repayment to be made from rentals paid by the several offices and
agencies.
The New Mexico court in 1941 held the enabling legislation
unconstitutional in State Office Building Commission 11. Trujillo31
on the ground that as the statute designated the commission an agency
of the state and the prospective lessees were clearly agencies of the
state, "the state would be dealing with itself" in the lease arrangements.
Since there would be only one party to such arrangements, no contract
could result. The court termed the lease a device "which cannot be
upheld except only under the theory of a special fund being created
out of moneys to be raised whereby the agencies would be enabled
to pay rentals . . . ,"38 and then held the special fund doctrine was
inapplicable as "[i]t is not specified in the Act that such moneys to
be raised for payments of rentals shall come out of excise taxes or from
any source aside or apart from general taxation."30
The Maine justices, in an advisory opinion, held that the contemplated contract would be a contract of purchase with the so-called
rental the purchase price which the state would pay for the building.
The state would thus incur a liability which would have to be included
with existing liabilities to determine whether the constitutional debt
limitation had been violated. It was immaterial whether the payments
to be made by the state were termed rentals or instalments; the legal
effect was the same.40
The New Jersey court in 1953 distinguished between the "external
appearance" and the "substance" of legislation when, in McCutcheon
41
11. State Building Authority, it held that while the form of the statute
provided the state with leasehold interests in building facilities for
public use, actually it was designed to permit the state ''by contracts
of purchase to acquire . . . buildings possessed and constructed by
the Authority by means of bond issues sustained by the State's promise
to supply in the guise of rentals sufficient money to liquidate the bonds,
available only through the medium of annual appropriations."42 The
rentals were described as
"the purchase price of the property, for they are to be sufficient
in amount to defray the Authority's operating expenses and in the
end to liquidate the principal of the bonds and the interest accrus1 State Office Building Commission v. Trujillo, 46 N.M. 29, 120 P. (2d) 434 (1941).
38Jd. at 52.
aoJd. at 47.
40 Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. 183 at 189, 79 A. (2d) 753 (1951).
41 McCutcheon v. State Building Authority, 13 N.J. 46, 97 A. (2d) 753 (1953).
42Jd. at 57.
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ing thereon. Were this not so, the Authority would be unable
to function, for it would have no other source of revenue adequate
to retire the bonds."43
The entire transaction was held to be "a contrivance to accomplish
that which by the same means the State could not do directly." 44
Although the enabling statutes for state office buildings in Maine
and New Jersey were held unconstitutional on the ground that the
proposed transactions were essentially purchases and not .leases, and
hence the obligations of the authority were the obligations of the state,
to be included in determining whether there had been a violation of
the constitutional debt limitation, the Wisconsin court in State ex rel.
Thomson v. Giessel, 45 decided in August 1954, took a different approach to the problem.
The legislature46 had authorized the Wisconsin State Building
Commission to complete the existing State Office Building. The land
and present structure were to be leased to the Wisconsin State Public
Building Corporation. The corporation was empowered to mortgage
this leasehold interest as security for a loan to discharge outstanding
indebtedness on the original structure and secure funds for the addition. The commission proposed to lease the land and existing building
for £.fty years; the corporation was then to re-lease the same real estate
plus the addition to the commission for thirty-four years, and to
mortgage its leasehold interest in the entire property to the State Investment Board which would then assign the security to the Allstate
Insurance Company in return for the funds needed.
Although the proposed transaction was held to create a state debt
falling within the constitutional debt limitation, the decision of the
court was not based on the ground that the proposed lease between
the commission and the corporation actually involved only one party,
nor on the ground that the state would supply revenues for the rentals
to be paid by the several departments and agencies to occupy the
offices, rentals which would provide income to retire the debt due the
Allstate Insurance Company for funds required to construct the addition and to retire the outstanding debt on the original building.
The Wisconsin decision rested solely on the point that the proposed transaction would mortgage existing state property. It refused
to £.nd a valid distinction between the encumbering of a leasehold
43 Id. at
44 Jbid.
45 (Wis.

46

59.

1954) 65 N.W. (2d) 529 (1954).
Wis. Stat. (1953) §§14.86, 14.88.
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or the mortgaging of a title in fee "from the standpoint of whether the
loan for the payment of which state property is pledged or mortgaged
for security constitutes a state debt...." The court acknowledged the
conllict between its earlier decisions in Morgan 11. Portage41 (followed
later in Morris 11. Ellis48 ) and in Loomis v. Callahan. 49 It admitted
that the effect of Loomis v. Callahan "was to hold that the mortgaging
of a leasehold interest in existing state property to secure a loan of the
lessee corporation does not constitute a state debt."50 The decision
stated:
"Logically there would seem to be just as much coercion on
the part of the state to pay an indebtedness, for the payment of
which existing state property, or an interest therein, had been
pledged as security but the state had not otherwise agreed to pay
the debt, as there would be in case of a debt as to which the state
had made itself directly liable for the payment thereof."51
The court then held that Loomis v. Callahan was overruled to the
extent it was authority for the proposition that "the encumbering of
an interest in existing state property as security for a loan, as to which
the state is not otherwise directly liable to make payment, does not
make such loan a debt of the state in violation of ... the constitution."52
Thus, within three years, three courts have held that obligations
issued by a state-created authority to erect a facility for the sole use of
the state created an obligation on the part of the state, although the
issues presented were not decided upon the same grounds.
From the available decisions, it is difficult to select any criterion
which the courts have considered particularly important in determining
whether debts of a state-created authority are in fact debts of the state.
A number of criteria have been employed, including the ultimate
ownership of the facility constructed by the authority, the pledging
of state-owned property as security for the authority's obligations, the
need for two distinct parties to create a valid contract, the form of
the contract entered into between the authority and the agencies of
the state ( whether a long-term lease or a contract of instalmentpurchase), the source of the authority's income (whether from fees
47 State

ex rel. Morgan v. Portage, 174 Wis. 588, 184 N.W. 376 (1921).

~s Morris v. Ellis, 221 Wis. 307, 266 N.W. 921 (1936).
49 Loomis v. Callahan, 196 Wis. 518, 220 N.W. 816 (1928).
50 State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, (Wis. 1954) 65 N.W. (2d) 529 at
51 Id. at 540. The case attracted considerable attention in Wisconsin.

539.
The initial
decision was handed down in August 1954. Petitioner immediately filed a motion for
rehearing, which was denied in October 1954.
52 lbid.
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paid by a special group of users, segregated revenues from designated
taxes, rentals paid by state agencies supplied from state appropriations).
Some courts have been inclined to consider paramount the need for
the particular facility and, in assisting the legislature to secure it by
upholding the constitutionality of the enabling statutes, have been
reluctant to analyze the exact nature of the constitutional problems
involved.
Granted the need for certain capital improvements which cannot
be financed wholly within an annual budget, how should a court
fulfill its function of adapting the law to fit current needs in the light
of the constitutional debt limitation? Where there is no pledge of
existing state property and a special fund furnished by users of the
particular facility is the sole income of the authority, there seems every
reason to consider that in fact the state has assumed no obligation:
its property is not pledged and it is not committed to any future expenditure. Where, however, the state creates an authority and the
authority issues evidences of indebtedness to finance a building, the
offices of which are to be leased to state agencies which rely for their
income on annual state appropriations, the state in fact has assumed
the obligation to make such appropriations, especially where upon
repayment of the authority's indebtedness, title to the facility is to
vest in the state. It may be true that the state as the state has not issued
the evidences of indebtedness, but the purchasers of the authority's
obligations are aware that the agencies of the state have contracted to
pay rent to the authority, thus providing it with a source of revenue,
and that the state will make appropriations to cover the annual expenses
of the agencies. If the courts are prepared to hold that the state incurs
a debt when its property, which has been leased to an authority, is
pledged as security for repayment of the authority's obligations, it seems
inconsistent and unrealistic to hold that no debt is incurred where the
state through its agencies enters into long-term leases with the statecreated authority and where the rentals payable under such leases are
fixed to retire the authority's obligations, upon payment of which the
facility is to become the property of the state. The pledging of state
property and the long-term lease which lays upon future state legislatures the duty of making annual appropriations, both create obligations and hence should be held to incur state debts.
If a constitutional requirement or prohibition exists, it is the duty
of the courts to construe it in the light of its obvious meaning, not to
twist it into approval of some end, however socially desirable that end
may be. If changing social values demonstrate the desirability of re-
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vising state constitutional debt limitations to permit the contracting of
long-term debts for desired objectives, the voters should make the
revision. In the meantime, those courts which lend judicial approval
to schemes deliberately designed to circumvent the plain meaning of
constitutional provisions are aiding legislators to assume powers denied
them under the provisions of state constitutions.
Elizabeth Gaspar Brown*

* Research Assistant, Univ. of Michigan Law School.-Ed.

